The Weak Suffer as They Must - or maybe not. How Trump Is Already Losing a Trade War He Was Supposed to Win

Sources (12) ↓

"I know that these are dark days... dark days brought on by a country we can no longer trust." — Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney

"I think a lot of Canadians feel that what Trump wants from these trade negotiations is … to turn Canada into a kind of American Belarus…" — David Frum, political commentator and former Bush administration speechwriter

On August 21, U.S. and Canadian negotiators walked away from the table, unable to reach a deal to avert a trade war. The immediate points of disagreement were auto parts, dairy supply management, and softwood lumber. But beyond violating the USMCA that the Trump administration itself negotiated in Trump's first term, a darker and more deeply antagonistic impulse appears to be driving the U.S. position.

Two of Canada's non-negotiable red lines were the dual use of French and English on products sold domestically, and limits on Canada's ability to strike trade deals with other sovereign powers. It strains credulity that any Canadian prime minister could accept either condition. The language issue brushes uncomfortably close to Quebec — and while Quebec-Ottawa relations haven't been a flashpoint recently, the province's separatist movement is never far beneath the surface, meaning that caving to this demand could seriously strain Canada's internal cohesion. As for Canada's ability to negotiate with other international partners, no democratic, economically advanced G7 nation would ever accept that kind of encroachment on its sovereignty — another uncrossable red line for any Canadian leader.

In contrast to the U.S., which generally views this as yet another of Trump's trade wars, for Canada this matter has moved beyond an economic dispute and become a defining national moment. Polling shows the sharpest deterioration in Canadian sentiment toward the U.S. in the history of the relationship: roughly two-thirds of Canadians already called the U.S. "unfriendly" or an "enemy" a year ago, and recent polling puts the share of Canadians describing the relationship as negative at 81%, against just 31% of Americans who say the same. The consequences are rapidly becoming substantial: cross-border tourism has fallen sharply — down at least 22% by official Statistics Canada figures, with independent cellphone-tracking data putting the real decline closer to 42% — provinces and businesses have pulled American liquor and food products from their shelves, and Canadian firms, with federal backing, are actively rerouting supply chains away from U.S. sources. Ontario Premier Doug Ford, hardly a reflexive Trump antagonist, has said the tariffs make Washington look like it's "treating us like we're Communist China."

Like China and the Iranian regime, the Canadian government appears to have a much stronger grasp of American domestic politics than the Trump administration itself. Ottawa's retaliatory list, effective September 8, reads like a targeting document: bourbon (Kentucky, Tennessee), peanuts (Georgia, Alabama), orange juice (Florida), manufactured goods (Michigan, Ohio) — deliberately weighted toward Republican and swing-state production, timed two months ahead of the midterms. Industry Minister Mélanie Joly has said openly that the tariffs are meant to "put political pressure" on the GOP before Americans vote.

Though the administration doesn't appear to have worked especially hard to prevent the talks from collapsing, the timing could hardly be worse for Trump and the Republican Party. In February, the Supreme Court struck down the IEEPA-based "Liberation Day" tariffs 6–3, ruling that Trump had exceeded his statutory authority — Congress, Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the majority, grants tariff power only through clear and carefully constrained delegation, which IEEPA did not provide. The administration's fallback was a 10% global tariff under Section 122 of the Trade Act. But for Canada specifically, it reached further, invoking Section 338 of the 1930 Tariff Act — part of the original Smoot-Hawley package, and a provision no president had used in the 96 years it had existed. That the administration's legal footing for a fight with its closest ally rests on a Depression-era statute that helped strangle global trade the last time it was seriously deployed suggests a policy built on whatever authority survives judicial scrutiny, rather than a coherent trade strategy.

Why would the Trump administration, already at risk of catastrophic losses in the midterm elections, choose to undertake such an apparently self-defeating set of policies at this point in time?

As with most Trump policies, there is little internal coherence within the political machinery driving it. Some, such as senior economic advisor Peter Navarro and Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, assert these tariffs will bring manufacturing back to the U.S. — which has not happened. Others, including U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, and National Economic Council Director Kevin Hassett, hoped to use tariffs as leverage to pressure Canada into conforming to U.S. preferences on trade and commerce. If so, that bet appears to have backfired spectacularly.

It seems highly likely that the single biggest driver of Trump's tariff strategy is Trump himself, and that the tariffs are only a small sample of something much more profound. David Frum has argued that Trump's vision for America has more in common with China's approach to statecraft than with traditional American policy — a belief in great-power politics rather than the U.S.-designed open global order, a world where, as Thucydides put it more than two thousand years ago, "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer as they must." Trump sees Canada as a mere appendage of the United States, and not a very successful one at that. He has continually belittled Canada and its prime ministers — referring to Justin Trudeau as "Governor" and repeatedly contending that Canada should become the "51st state," asserting recently on Truth Social that "Canada wants the benefits of being a State, without being one!!!" Administration allies have echoed the line publicly, a sign it resonates within the White House and with Trump's base.

Trump is almost assuredly right that economically the United States is in a far stronger position to win a trade war than Canada. With only about 12% of the U.S. population (roughly 41 million versus 340 million) and an economy a fraction of America's size, Canada is extremely vulnerable to U.S. pressure. Roughly three-quarters of Canada's exports go to the U.S., while less than a fifth of American exports go to Canada — though Canada remains America's largest single trading partner.

But economics is only part of the picture. Americans are increasingly fed up with the Trump administration — the endless conflict with Iran, the tariffs, the inflation, the corruption, incompetence, and mismanagement. Picking a fight with a country most Americans like only reinforces the perception that this administration has run off the rails. By contrast, Canada has been unified by PM Carney's response, with support coming from surprising quarters — a coalition spanning Quebec Premier Christine Fréchette's CAQ government, Doug Ford's Progressive Conservatives in Ontario, and Wab Kinew's NDP government in Manitoba, partisan rivals united by a shared sense of outrage at America's tactics.

Canada also serves as a litmus test for America's role in the world. As Frum points out, if the U.S. treats one of its closest allies the way Russia treats Belarus, what does that signal to countries that don't share America's continent or cultural heritage? South Korea, Japan, the EU, even Great Britain are all watching closely, wondering how they fit into America's new world order. As even the Cato Institute's Scott Lincicome notes, Washington's unpredictable, transactional mindset reinforces the perception that the U.S. is a bad-faith bargainer, and all but guarantees that other nations will hedge their bets and diversify their supply chains away from American dependence. The damage will be hard to undo, and at a time when the U.S. faces challenges across the globe, alienating traditional allies is very bad policy.

Sources

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  1. Inside the 72 hours that cratered the US – Canada trade deal – (Daniel Desrochers, Megan Messerly, Nick Taylor-Vaisey, Ari Hawkins and Oliver Ward/Politico) Read article politico.com
  2. US- Canada trade breakdown shows the limits of Trump’s aggressive trade strategy (David J. Lynch/Washington Post) Read article washingtonpost.com
  3. The lesson from Canada’s collapsed trade deal: negotiation may be futile (Olivia Bowden/The Guardian) Read article theguardian.com
  4. US nearly encroached on Canadian sovereignty during tariff talks: Quebec premier (Hayley Carolan/Canadian Broadcast Network) Read article cbc.ca
  5. “Closest target:” Why is Donald Trump so focused on Canada? (Jillian Kestler D’Amours/Al Jazeera) Read article aljazeera.com
  6. US-Canada trade war deepens as Trump revives Depression-era trade tool – what’s at stake for consumers and the mid-terms (Kent Jones/The Conversation) Read article theconversation.com
  7. Canadians fume, Americans shrug: 81% of Canadians see negative relationship with the US, while on 31% Americans agree: polling (Graeme Gordon/The Hub (Canada)) - ) Read article thehub.ca
  8. Canada hits back at US with tariffs targeting hot spots (Paul Viera/Wall Street Journal) Read article wsj.com
  9. Canada’s tariffs target certain US states. See which regions are most vulnerable (Megan Cerullo and Aimee Picchi/CBS News) Read article cbsnews.com
  10. US and Canada are bracing for a prolonged trade dispute (Gavin Bade and Amanda Colletta/Wall Street Journal) Read article wsj.com
  11. As U.S.-Canada trade war escalates, Ontario Premier Doug Ford says Trump is "treating us like we're Communist China" (Joe Walsh/CBS News) Read article cbsnews.com
  12. Canada has 1 important edge in the North American trade war (Daniel Desrochers, Zi-Ann Lum, Oliver Ward and Ari Hawkins/Politico) Read article politico.com

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