In 1909, the English journalist and Nobel Laureate Norman Angell wrote an enormously influential book, The Grand Illusion, which posited that the likelihood of war on the European continent was extremely low given the interrelationships -- particularly economic - that had emerged in the previous generation. War, he asserted, was no longer about capturing wealth. Instead, wealth came from economic ties - and no rational power would risk losing that wealth. Of course, that thesis was shredded in 1914 with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the devastation of the First World War. Twenty years later, that lesson had to be learned again in the even more destructive Second World War.
In the decades following the Cold War, Europe and the US moved heavily in the direction of global economic integration - believing that the best way to work with Russia and particularly China was to encase both countries in a web of trade and international relationships that would make them unwilling to risk overturning the system. Despite important disagreements with China on a wide range of issues from trade to security, that nation so far remains a status quo power. But with Russia, this concept has clearly failed - completely. As was the case in 1914 and 1939, forces beyond economics have provided the impetus for conflict.
The impact of Russia's war on Ukraine has been profound, but the response to Russian aggression depends on the orientation of the nations concerned. The barometer of responses was provided by a UN resolution condemning Russian aggression against Ukraine on March 2. 141 nations voted for the resolution, 5 were opposed, and 35 nations abstained. Besides Russia, those opposed included Belarus, Syria, Eritrea and North Korea - about as unsavory a lineup as one can imagine. It is in the ranks of the abstainers that the most surprises are to be found.
In Europe, the biggest transition has been the stunning reversal of German policy. More than any other country, Germany had hoped that its economic ties with Russia would create a solid basis for future cooperation. In two weeks, Germany has completed a stunning reversal of 70 years of an essentially pacifist foreign policy and taken the lead on an assertive response to the invasion, including mothballing the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline. The rest of Europe has been extremely supportive of sanctions - even Serbia, seen by many as pro-Russian. President Macron of France, embarrassed by President Putin, has ceased to try to play the role of intermediary between Russia and the West, while the former Warsaw Treaty Organization members - all of whom remember their own histories of Russian occupation - have accepted large numbers of refugees and strongly supported sanctions. Turkey, which has drifted away from NATO in the past few years, seems to have moved firmly back into the camp of the West - at least on this issue.
In Latin America, most nations - many of which see echoes of American interference in their domestic affairs - have been appalled by the Russian attack. Regional organizations such as the OAS and 15 members of the Caribbean Community (CariCom) have been unequivocal in their condemnation of the invasion. A few nations, such Venezuela and Nicaragua, were initially supportive of Russia's position, but in the end voted to abstain from the UN resolution, along with Bolivia and Cuba (Venezuela apparently did not even vote to abstain).
It is in Asia where the responses get the most nuanced. Japan, South Korea, and Singapore all voted for the UN resolution, while unsurprisingly Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Vietnam and Kazakhstan voted to abstain. All have economic and geographic reasons for wanting to avoid offending Russia. Also in this category is India, which has leased a nuclear attack submarine from Russia and has extensive military contracts with the Russian government. But the Modhi government is feeling the heat: it has already called for a "truce", and most Indian security experts believe that the country's balancing act may wear thin over time - especially since it needs Western military assistance (the "Quad") to deal with its own emerging competition with China.
And China is the most interesting UN abstention. China and Russia declared a "friendship with no limits" just before the Beijing Winter Olympics and agreed to a range of trade deals, including $117.5 billion in new energy contracts and increased purchases of Russian agricultural products. These purchases were seen as a way of insulating Russia from potential sanctions. But Xi may not have anticipated that Russia would actually invade Ukraine; he may well have calculated that Putin's threats were giving him what he wanted - a divided NATO and a destabilized Ukraine. The war puts China in a very difficult spot - fundamental tenets of Chinese policy are non-interference in domestic affairs and the inviolability of international borders, boundaries which Putin has now obliterated. While happy to see American attention diverted from the Pacific, the sanctions placed on Russia will almost assuredly affect the Chinese economy given the extensive contacts between the two countries. The strong international support for sanctions - and the diplomatic isolation of Russia -- are also clearly having an impact on Chinese thinking. There are concerns that too strong an identification with Russia could cut China off from important economic opportunities and sources of innovation. And as always in the background, looms the issue of Taiwan - seen by China as a renegade province but by most of the world as a vibrant democracy. The Russian invasion makes any sort of absorption of Taiwan a much more difficult calculus for Chinese leaders.
The pace of change in the international sphere has been breathtaking - and will likely only get more complicated. As Vladminr Lenin noted, "wars are great accelerators of history" - something that, as a former member of the KGB/FSB, Vladimir Putin should have remembered before starting his war.