At the end of September, Russian President Vladimir Putin once again warned that, as he annexed four regions of Ukraine invaded by Russia, he would use “all means at his disposal” to defend Russian territory, of which the four regions (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia) are supposedly now a part. This threat, which he stated “was not a bluff,” was widely interpreted to mean up to and including the use of nuclear weapons. A few weeks earlier, on September 9, North Korea’s leader - the “Great Successor,” Kim Jong Un - announced that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was now a nuclear weapons state. He then authorized the launch of a ballistic missile over Japan on October 4, prompting Japanese officials to issue a “shelter in place warning” to its citizenry.
Until recently, concerns about the potential use of nuclear weapons have been receding. Since 1945, no nation has used nuclear weapons in combat, for the obvious reason that to do so would invite immediate and devastating retaliation. So why do North Korea and Russia now want to draw attention to their nuclear weapons capabilities? The answer is, in both cases: weakness.
During the Cold War, strategic nuclear weapons were seen as weapons of last resort, useful only to stave off defeat and destruction (though there was a good bit of ambiguity on the part of NATO, which was concerned about its ability to fend off a Soviet invasion). That fact is still true - which is a key reason that North Korea's leadership was willing to pay a terrible price, including mass starvation, to build a small nuclear arsenal and, equally importantly, a missile system to deliver the warheads. For the Kim family dynasty, nuclear weapons were the only way to even the odds with a South Korea that is now far more economically and militarily powerful than its northern neighbor. Kim Jong Un has been explicit in his assertion that it sees North Korea's arsenal as critical to its survival.
For Russia, the calculus is different. Putin's leadership has not been threatened by NATO or the United States. But increasingly, Russia's dismal battlefield performance in Ukraine has undermined Putin's ability to prosecute his war of annexation, which in turn could threaten his control of Russia. Defeat now looks possible, and the fear is that an increasingly desperate Putin might turn to smaller, battlefield nuclear weapons (also known as "tactical nukes") to stave off defeat.
The US, an early adopter of tactical nukes (including the Davy Crockett, designed to be launched from a jeep), has moved away from their use, in large part because "smart" weapons, of which the US has an abundance, are actually much more effective and don't endanger friendly forces or poison the land with radiation. During the Korean War, American commanders twice considered using nuclear weapons, first during the initial stages of the war when it looked like the American army might be pushed into the sea and then following Chinese intervention when UN forces were in headlong retreat. The nation's political and military leadership concluded that such use would gain them little except international opprobrium and would likely not alter the course of the war much. They also worried that they would endanger US/UN and South Korean troops almost as much as the North Koreans and Chinese.
That calculus has not really changed. Security commentators have pointed out that an American response to a potential nuclear attack by Russia against Ukrainian forces or North Korea against South Korea would not need a nuclear response - NATO and US/South Korean forces could probably annihilate Russian or North Korean military capabilities using only conventional smart weapons. The Russians, by contrast, have depleted their smart munitions and for a variety of reasons, including sanctions, are having a hard time replacing them. The North Koreans probably have no smart weapons at all. Thus, despite the drawbacks, nuclear weapons might therefore look like viable alternatives to Putin and Kim.
The problem, of course, is that once the nuclear genie is out of the bottle it might not go back in again. In Ukraine, if NATO and the US were to attack Russian forces -- even just those believed to have launched or be capable of launching nuclear weapons -- the Russians might escalate, pushing the two sides into the nightmare of nuclear war that the world has dreaded since the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The West has to hope that Putin - and Kim -- are both rational enough to peer over the abyss without actually jumping.