I recently returned from the better part of a month in Britain and France. The mood towards America, reflected also in domestic US headlines, is one of disbelief and shock: Disbelief that the United States would actually blow up a system that has worked so long and so well at creating wealth and stability, and shock at the speed of the transition. Rather than reacting with anger, the response seems to be one of regret – a sense that Europeans thought Americans were better than this.
This sentiment is not uniform across Europe. Many Europeans, particularly those from the working classes and in Eastern Europe, agree with what they think they see in Donald Trump’s vision of the future – decisive leadership, a belief in strong national identity alongside a deep distrust of transnational institutions, anger at elites and elite institutions, hostility towards immigrants and admiration for Trump’s willingness to break long-established legal and cultural norms; all of this finds approval in corners of Europe. Even Trump’s often boorish language generates approbation from those nursing a sense of grievance with a system that has left them behind.
For many educated Europeans, a defining moment in the changing narrative was Vice President JD Vance’s statements of support for far right political parties at the February 14 Munich security conference. Vance’s identification of the threat to Europe coming from “commissars” suppressing free speech (from far-right groups) rather than Russia and China heralded a new and very different relationship between the US and Europe. It was also deeply unwelcome, since unlike the United States, Europeans actually do have relatively recent experience with authoritarianism: either some variation of right wing ideology (Italian Fascism, German and Austrian Nazism, and various authoritarian versions in Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, etc.), or left wing variants in Eastern Europe, where Communist authoritarian ideology imported from the Soviet Union replaced the homegrown right wing authoritarianism after World War II, well within living memory. And of course many European nations that did not succumb to authoritarianism were invaded and occupied. Vance’s rhetorical support for political parties such as Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany or the PVV in the Netherlands therefore does not strike Europeans as simply naïve and foolish (though it is) but as something potentially far more ominous.
This sense of separating values between America and other democracies has also been evident in the realm of security. Since Trump has never worked well with others and understands little of global affairs, his understanding of international agreements is minimal and transactional. This is best exemplified by his belief that NATO, the most successful alliance in modern history, is a mechanism for Europeans (and apparently, Canadians) to “rip off” the United States. While Trump and Vance’s statements on NATO and admiration for Putin elicited general concern, it was the now infamous March 1 meeting with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy in the Oval Office which truly shocked Europe’s policy elite, demonstrating beyond doubt that the Trump administration had become antagonistic to the 80 year security relationship between the US and Europe.
For the European public, what really brought home that the ground had shifted was Trump’s imposition of unilateral tariffs, since these impact everyone by raising prices, fouling supply chains, and creating massive uncertainty. Besides confounding European CEOs, who find themselves at a loss to explain why they believed Trump would be good for the international system and for their own companies, the tariffs have also created a conundrum for Europe’s political right, creating a backlash against populist politicians and calling their appreciation for Trump’s policies into question.
Americans have endured waves of populism before, from the Protestant and anti-Catholic Know Nothings in the 1840s, through the “Greenback Party” of the 1880s, to the 20th century Tea Party and 21st century Occupy Wall Street movements. None has ever had the global impact of Trump’s brand of populism, largely because none of these movements were designed to enable the United States to eviscerate the global system it created and maintained for 80 years. For Europeans, Trump’s support for anti-democratic right wing political parties, trade wars and hostility towards NATO represents something far more sinister than it does in the United States, since unlike Europeans, most Americans do not associate the collapse of a stable economic order with political chaos, authoritarianism and conflict. The danger for the United States is that even if rationality returns to the nation’s political and economic system – not a given – American politicians may find that our allies in Europe will have moved on to create a political and economic system that no longer relies on American leadership, creating a potential competitor where none existed before.