On June 4, President Trump complained on Truth Social that it was “HARD” to make a deal on tariffs with China’s President Xi. It might have been a surprise to Trump and his economic team, but not to China and not to the rest of the world. Though the administration now claims that the US and China have a “deal,” it is not so much a firm compact as a handshake agreement that could easily unravel. The Wall Street Journal editorial board asserts that Trump and his advisors no strategy on trade with China, which is likely true, but the bigger problem is that they have fundamentally misunderstood the reasons for America’s manufacturing decline – only part of which relates to China -- and miscalculated the responses from China and other trading partners.
China has been preparing for a new trade war with America since Trump’s first term, when Trump’s rhetoric and actions demonstrated that US trade policies would be both more assertive and less stable than before. As a result, over time, Chinese companies shifted their supply chains away from US sources while the Chinese government created new pathways for commerce across Asia, Africa and South America (most obviously the Belt Road Initiative but also bilateral and regional trade agreements) and focused more on the internal development of key industries, particularly those deemed critical to China’s economic future and those proven to be vulnerable to US trade sanctions and tariffs. Two factors have helped China in its trade war with the US: First and foremost, as a top down single-party state, China is immune to congressional (and presidential) electoral cycles and, to some degree, public opinion. This makes it much easier for the Chinese government to mobilize its resources and maintain a domestic political consensus. The second factor, perhaps almost as important, is that much of what China buys from the US is replaceable: beef, wheat, soybeans, cotton and other agricultural products can be replaced by other countries: Australia and Argentina (beef), Egypt and India (cotton), Brazil, Canada, Argentina (soybeans), and Argentina, Canada, Russia and India (wheat). At the same time, what the US imports from China cannot be so easily replaced: consumer electronics, batteries, rare earth minerals, and machinery are all heavily dependent on Chinese material and manufacturers. Taken together, these two factors make China much better prepared to play the long game, even if it must also absorb a good bit of economic pain.
There’s another problem with Trump’s belief that manufacturing jobs have been lost to China and other nations, including our allies in Asia, North America and Europe. Quite simply, it is a completely outdated concept. After the initial “China Shock” – the loss of manufacturing and jobs to China after that country joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 - most job losses have been to technology, efficiency and automation. As Daren Acemoglu and Pascual Restrepo and data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics have demonstrated, robots are cheaper than workers – even those working in China.
The jobs that went to China during the “China Shock” were clustered amongst low and medium-skilled workers. But those jobs that have come back require different – and almost always upgraded -- skill sets. According to The Economist magazine, while the US is still the world’s second largest manufacturer, and its production is twice what it was in the 1980s, four decades later those goods are produced by fewer than 20% of the factory floor workers.
And importantly, those jobs when they do come back do not return to the same states which lost them: they come back to the states which are the most responsive to corporate needs. While California, Washington, Texas, Colorado and Massachusetts have all created new and mostly higher paid jobs than those lost to China, Manufacturing.net noted in 2024 that “the manufacturing recovery has not reached…the so-called “Rust Belt” states of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin.” In many ways, Rust Belt states are in competition less with China (and California and Massachusetts) than with Sun Belt states, which have seen a surge in manufacturing. A case in point, according to Fortune magazine, is that Alabama is now number one in auto exports despite having had no car manufacturing at all in 1992. With innovation driven industries such as technology (including emergent AI), biotechnology, and renewable energy clustered on the coasts, and manufacturing moving to the Sun Belt, a large part of America – particularly in the heartland of the Midwest and Appalachia -- have found it difficult to compete with other states for the industries of the future. Industry publications now indicate that while there are more jobs than workers in the Sun Belt, states such as Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania are most at risk of further de-industrialization if they are unable to adapt.
There is a political dimension to this, which makes resolving this state of affairs even more difficult: where workers once moved to find better jobs, today’s workforce is actually less mobile than their forebears. Family obligations, ties to their locality, and high home prices in states where skilled workers are in demand make it harder for job seekers to relocate. The impact, well documented by sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild, is stagnation, a loss of pride and an abiding resentment at the political system, particularly with Democrats who are seen as elite, pro-immigrant, “woke” and out of touch with the needs of rural America – a view reinforced by Fox News and conservative media outlets. All of these dynamics play into the hands of Donald Trump and conservative legislators. Despite the strange fact that many of Trump’s policies – particularly on trade -- are more likely to hurt conservative states than their more progressive counterparts, until the Democrats are able to figure out a way to create and communicate a set of pragmatic policies that appeal to rural and working class voters, they will struggle to win elections in the Midwest and Rust Belt.