President Trump’s attacks targeting alleged drug boats in the Caribbean follow a pattern often utilized by his administration: assert that an “immediate threat” exists where none existed before, and then bring the full force of the national security state to bear on that (supposed) threat. This playbook has been used domestically to justify the administration’s harsh crackdown on immigration, and now with the boat strikes, internationally as well. In this case, the “immediate threat” is the drugs that may or may not be headed for the United States (the first boat blown up by the military was apparently en route to Suriname, which is a transshipment point for Europe rather than North America).
For good reason, the response by human rights and legal scholars, former military officers and Judge Advocates Generals (JAGs), many politicians and former (as in non-current) Trump administration officials has been uniformly negative. As conservative Washington Post columnist George Will stated “Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth seems to be a war criminal. Without a war. An interesting achievement.”
Outside of administration officials and a handful of allies in Congress, few have risen to defend the strikes. But it is important to note that the attacks are a part of a broader effort by Secretary of Defense (or is it War?) Pete Hegseth and other administration officials to undermine the “stupid” and “politically correct” rules of engagement which govern the conduct of the US military. According to the Wall Street Journal, these rules of engagement are frequently portrayed by Hegseth and other Pentagon officials as undermining America’s “warrior ethos” by forcing the military to abide “by rules written by dignified men in mahogany rooms 80 years ago." Those rules would be the Geneva Conventions, one of the 20th century’s great humanitarian achievements.
Far from being an external set of constraints foisted upon the United States by foreign powers, the US was actually the driving force in creating the laws of war as we now understand them. During the American Revolution, George Washington urged adoption of European principles of war, which in turn were based on chivalric concepts from the Middle Ages, often honored in the breach but still considered an ideal. In part because of his frustration at the frequently poor treatment of prisoners of war by both American and British forces, Washington never ceased working for humane treatment of POWs and their swift repatriation, even after leaving public office.
The watershed moment for the United States came during the American Civil War, when President Lincoln was confronted with a conundrum: How to suppress a great rebellion by military force while at the same time avoiding unnecessary brutality, which would make reconciliation infinitely harder – if not impossible. The result was the first codification of humane laws of war ever issued to a field army, General Order 100. This order, often known as the “Lieber Code” after its primary author, Francis Lieber, a German American jurist, has served as the foundation for US military law to the present day. The code explicitly stated that “men who take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God.” This was a radical concept for the time: the military’s right to injure its enemy was not absolute but limited by our common humanity. The code inspired the European powers to adopt similar rules in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.
Following the horrors of World War II – brought into sharp focus by use of the term “crimes against humanity” at the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals - the United States helped convene what would eventually become the Geneva Conventions of 1949. These conventions govern the conduct of war to the present day. They are so embedded within the framework of US military law that the foreword to the current manual, drafted by the Department of Defense’s General Counsel in 2015, states that “The law of war is part of who we are….a part of our military heritage, and obeying it is the right thing to do.” A key element of the manual’s instructions is that these laws are non-reciprocal, meaning that no matter what the enemy does to American POWs, the United States is obligated to treat enemy wounded and prisoners humanely. The manual states that enemy combatants that are out of combat (hors de combat) are no longer legitimate targets, even determining that, as an example, “[o]rders to fire upon the shipwrecked would be clearly illegal.” Every US officer is expected to be familiar with the manual, and there is an extensive body of US military law and scholarship – much of it emanating from within the military -- supporting humane treatment of enemy combatants. And of course, those crewing the targeted boats are not military combatants, but civilians, compounding the potential for war crimes.
It is important to note that the US adheres – or has adhered – to these laws of war not just because it sees itself as a civilized nation. It also does so because the laws of war help maintain “good military order,” reinforcing institutional pride and maintaining the moral high ground, something which distinguishes professional militaries from armed mobs (and the Russian military, which has no ingrained tradition of honorable conduct). Humane treatment of incapacitated adversaries also encourages other combatants to surrender rather than die fighting, to treat American POWs humanely, maintains support for the military as an institution with the American public, and supports American military goals and objectives, including obtaining intelligence and support from local populations. Lawlessness and war crimes undermine all of these objectives, making it much more difficult for the American military to operate effectively. The reputational damage caused by the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War and Abu Ghraib prison scandal during the Iraq war severely undermined American prestige and support for US objectives both domestically and internationally.
Clearly, there is a distinction between institutional policy and actual practice. It is an objective fact that the U.S. military has committed war crimes in the past, and enforcement of the laws of war has not always been consistent. But the institutional stance for humane treatment of adversaries reflects genuine recognition that war crimes are ultimately counterproductive, illegal, and corrosive to military effectiveness and legitimacy. As in so many areas, the Trump administration’s efforts to destroy existing institutional barriers will likely have many unforeseen – and potentially disastrous – consequences in the years to come.