"Don't it always seem to go that you don't know what you've got 'til it's gone" (Joni Mitchell, Big Yellow Taxi)
My wife and I recently took our first “leaf-peeping” trip in New England, courtesy of my Boston-based son and his wife. My son chose Bretton Woods as our home base because he knows of my interest in history, especially the Cold War. An important part of that history was made at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, which, together with the creation of the United Nations and NATO, shaped the world in which we live today, a world that has benefited the United States mightily and is now in serious jeopardy.
The trip left me struck by the jarring contrast with the news from Washington. The Wall Street Journal reports that Russian President Vladimir Putin has floated a summit with President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping to discuss a Ukraine deal. The Kremlin says the idea was raised in a call with Trump and could be taken up at next month’s APEC summit in Shenzhen. That comes days after Trump announced a deal to obtain Russian diesel and eased sanctions to allow it, a boon to Moscow. The pattern looks like an uncanny echo of the 1938 Munich Conference, where British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and French Premier Édouard Daladier agreed to hand Czechoslovakia’s most defensible and most industrialized region, the Sudetenland, to Adolf Hitler in exchange for “peace in our time.” Czechoslovakia itself was not at the table, and no one has said Ukraine would have a seat at this one. Spoiler alert: the Munich agreement failed, as it was always destined to, and Hitler launched the Second World War less than a year later.
But the Allies learned. In July 1944, at the height of the war (D-Day had occurred less than a month earlier), 730 delegates from 44 Allied nations met at the Mount Washington Hotel (pictured below) in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, for the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference. According to a plaque at the hotel, the delegates stayed so long that they had to ask the management for an extension, since other (paying) guests were waiting their turn. What emerged from their intensive stay was little short of remarkable: a blueprint for financial stability in the postwar world.
Mount Washington Hotel in Bretton Woods
The Gold Room at Mount Washington Hotel, where the Bretton Woods Accords were signed
The conference was a momentous undertaking, and its success resulted from a confluence of factors. The participants understood what was at stake: the likely consequences of failing to create a workable global monetary and financial framework. They recognized that nationalist “beggar thy neighbor” policies, including tariffs and competitive devaluations, had deepened the Great Depression and helped make authoritarian regimes, from Hitler’s Germany to militarist Japan, look like viable options to weakened democracies. The conviction that durable international institutions were needed as a bulwark against revanchist authoritarians was strongly held by President Franklin Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and by the leaders of the American and British delegations: Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, his aide Harry Dexter White, principal author of the American plan, and the redoubtable John Maynard Keynes, probably the best-known economist in the world. All agreed that, after the turmoil and antagonism of the 1930s, a liberal international economic system would strengthen the prospects for postwar peace and prosperity.
It is hard to overstate the conference’s importance to global stability over the past 80 years, and easy to take it for granted. Not every proposal was adopted, most regrettably an International Trade Organization, which would have created something like the WTO nearly half a century before the WTO existed. But the institutional framework American and British planners envisioned has endured. The US dollar became the world’s reserve currency, initially convertible to gold until President Nixon ended that convertibility in August 1971. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) both grew out of the agreement and have played a key role in the stability of the modern global financial architecture.
The two institutions are often confused. The IMF, with 191 members, safeguards the stability of the monetary system: it monitors economies, publishes global forecasts, and lends short term to countries in balance-of-payments trouble, usually in exchange for policy commitments. The World Bank is a development lender, financing long-term projects and reforms and offering low-cost or grant financing to the poorest countries. In short, the Fund steps in when a country is running out of money, while the Bank helps build the roads, schools and power plants that let poorer countries grow.
Perhaps underscoring how important both have proven, these institutions are one area where the Trump Administration has so far limited its interference. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has called for a “back to basics” approach, but the US remains a member, still makes its financial contributions, and has not moved to withdraw, though its FY27 budget request would trim international funding and it has pulled earlier pledges to the Bank’s concessional arm.
Yet President Trump shows little sign of grasping how an intricate web of political, economic, trade and financial arrangements, undergirded by the IMF, World Bank, UN and alliance systems, has safeguarded America’s security, economic and political, for more than 80 years and allowed it to remain the global power it is today. Putin reportedly wants the proposed summit to be a Yalta redux, with the great powers dividing up the world. Trump’s vision seems closer to that, or to the world George Orwell imagined in 1984, than to anything the Bretton Woods planners had in mind. But Russia, in John McCain’s memorable phrase, is “a gas station masquerading as a country,” one with nuclear weapons and a UN veto, whose economy is a fraction of America’s or China’s.
The rest of the world matters far more than Trump seems to comprehend. That world is learning to hedge against the United States, building early-stage alternatives to US-dominated institutions and expanding local-currency swap lines. These efforts are modest now and will not cost the dollar its reserve status overnight, since that status rests on market depth and legal protections. But over time they could grow into more serious challenges, and the system could well drift toward rival currency blocs. The worst case resembles the 1930s: competitive devaluations, capital controls, tariff spirals, and bilateral clearing arrangements. That is the world FDR worried about and Morgenthau, Keynes, White and their colleagues set out to prevent at Bretton Woods. The postwar institutions have real flaws, but reform is far preferable to abandonment. If the 1930s taught us anything, it is that the price of not having such institutions can be far higher than the price of having them.