“If it walks like a duck and it quacks like a duck, it’s a duck. If on the other hand it can’t make a noise and waddles and then falls over, it’s a lame duck. And a president at the end of a second term with a highly partisan Congress ranged against him is as lame a duck as you will ever see.” (Jon Sopel, BBC)
Perhaps the only people surprised by the Democratic “Blue Tsunami” were in Donald Trump’s White House. The rout was so complete that it invited comparison with the post-Watergate sweep of 1974, and it may not be over: a Senate seat and a handful of House races are still undecided, most leaning Democratic. Many Republican members saw the shellacking coming. The White House did not. Days before the wipeout, it released a short film, “President Trump’s second term has achieved more than any administration in American history,” a breathtakingly grandiose claim that ignores the accomplishments of, among others, Washington, Lincoln, and both Roosevelts. It also raises the question every president faces: what to do with the final two years, the “lame duck” period.
Most lame duck presidents turn to foreign affairs to burnish their image and cement a legacy. Theodore Roosevelt sent the Great White Fleet around the world to announce America’s arrival on the global stage (and still found time to make the Grand Canyon a national monument). Wartime presidents like Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman focused on ending World War II and building the political and economic order that followed. Eisenhower warned of the “military-industrial complex” and nudged the country away from confrontation with the Soviet Union. Carter worked to end the Iranian hostage crisis, and Reagan completed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty, easing tensions in Europe at the Cold War’s close. Clinton pursued Israeli-Palestinian peace, though the effort failed, and George W. Bush negotiated a status of forces agreement to draw down the U.S. presence in Iraq. Obama was the busiest of all, restoring relations with Cuba, pushing the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and negotiating limits on Iran’s nuclear program through the JCPOA, which Trump later abandoned.
Presidents gravitate to foreign policy because it is where the Constitution gives them the most room for independent action. Article II vests “the executive Power” in the president, who may negotiate treaties with the Senate’s advice and consent and appoint ambassadors. Congress, however, holds the powers to declare war, impose tariffs, and approve treaties, though the outgoing Congress has exercised almost none of them. The division looks cut and dried, but the line between the branches has been contested almost from the start.
That ambiguity first became visible in 1793, when Washington proclaimed neutrality in the war between Revolutionary France and Britain. In the Pacificus-Helvidius debates, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison argued over where the dividing line lay. Hamilton held that “the executive power of the nation is vested in the president; subject only to the exceptions and qualifications which are expressed in the instrument.” Foreign affairs, he reasoned, could belong “neither to the legislative nor judicial department,” and so “must belong to the executive.” Madison, writing as Helvidius, disagreed: the powers to declare war and make treaties, he argued, “can never fall within a proper definition of executive powers.” The courts have never settled the matter cleanly. United States v. Curtiss-Wright (1936) gave the president broad latitude abroad, while Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer (1952) held that presidential power is at its lowest ebb when it collides with the will of Congress.
Trump is less predictable than earlier lame ducks because he has broken with so much precedent. Americans are famously uninterested in international events, but this was an election in which foreign affairs mattered. Tariffs, rising gasoline and diesel prices, and inflation tied to both reminded voters how interconnected the world is, and a great many said so at the ballot box on November 3. Trump’s attacks on allies, his tariffs (which met almost no congressional pushback despite Congress’s explicit constitutional role), and his use of force, including strikes on Iran and on alleged drug boats, have little public support and have cost him goodwill with the incoming Congress. His efforts to broker peace on the Korean peninsula, in Ukraine, and in Gaza have stalled, and Iran remains intractable. Trump seems not to grasp that Tehran, Pyongyang, Moscow, and even Jerusalem are not primarily motivated by the prospect of a “deal,” and he lacks the patience and expertise to learn what does move them. That takes hard diplomatic work, but Trump values loyalty over expertise. He has sent Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff to make deals while hollowing out the State Department and National Security Council staff who would normally do the heavy lifting.
For the United States, the stakes are high and the strategic problems are mounting. China is growing more assertive, especially over Taiwan. Russia is escalating its campaign of sabotage across Europe and doubling down in Ukraine. America’s Gulf allies fear being targeted in a new round of conflict with Iran. America's European and Asian allies are bruised by two years of Trump administration belittling, and unsure of US commitments. And of course, the increasing power of artificial intelligence complicates every one of these relationships. Trump faces all this weakened, his mandate gone, and trusted by neither friends nor adversaries. If he wants a legacy beyond a ballroom, the empty shell of the Kennedy Center, a damaged Reflecting Pool, and an arch that may never be built, he will need, over the next two years, skills he has never shown.