It is now clear that many of the calculations that went into the Russian invasion of Ukraine have been incredibly inaccurate, encapsulated in a dark joke making the rounds in Russia: "The Russian Army is now on Day 30 of its two-day Special Military Operation."
As previously noted, a large number of countries have refused to condemn Russia for its invasion, for a variety of reasons. No country’s neutrality is more important to Russia than China, which alone among the global community probably has the capacity to bring the Russian invasion to a close. There are a number of reasons the Chinese have so far not done this.
First, both President Putin and President Xi share a common belief that their versions of authoritarian governance are in the ascendant vis a vis the obvious shortcomings of modern liberal democracy. Certainly, from this point of view, the chaos unleashed in Washington on January 6, 2021 seemed to indicate a democratic system in possibly terminal decline. Both Xi and Putin see each other as important allies in countering the West. This commonality of interests became the basis for the "Friendship with no limits" pact that was signed just before the Beijing Winter Olympics.
Second, both China and Russia share a long border (2615 miles long, to be exact) and deep economic ties. China buys Russian coal, oil, gas and wheat as well as military hardware, and increasingly invests in these industries in Russia. Russia purchases mechanical products, machinery and transport equipment, mobile phones, cars and consumer products from China - and even before the war, trade was up by 34% from the previous year.
Finally, China is also worried that if Putin fails to win, he and his system could face upheaval, disruption and even potential collapse. This could have domestic ramifications for Xi as he prepares for the upcoming Party Congress this fall and leave China with few important friends on the international stage.
But there are also important reasons for China to stay aloof from the conflict and avoid directly aiding Russia’s war effort. China’s ties to Russia are dwarfed by its economic relationship with the United States and EU, which are important markets for Chinese companies and critical sources of innovation: 10 times the trade with Russia. The war has already disrupted the Belt Road Initiative, and sanctions would severely hobble the Chinese economy at a time when Xi needs political stability and stable economic growth in the run up to the Party Congress
Politically, a guiding principle since the CCP’s accession to power in 1949 has been China’s insistence on sovereign borders and freedom from external interference, and this war certainly undermines that principle. Also important are the 3-5,000 Chinese nationals living in Ukraine, including students and about 1,000 Chinese married to Ukrainians.
The final calculation may be that, as long as China is careful, the country stands to benefit from the war. Russia, now crippled by sanctions, has very few options for trade and will need China to rebuild after the war ends. Putin, now a diminished figure internationally, is now very much the junior partner in this relationship and needs Xi much more than Xi needs Putin. At the least, China will get bargain basement prices on Russian raw materials and wheat. And so the thinking goes, with America and its allies diverted by Ukraine, there is less attention being paid to China's Pacific ambitions at the moment (a fact that does not seem lost on North Korea, which just launched another test missile).
China has so far played a waiting game - not condemning Russia, acknowledging the validity of Russian desires for security from NATO, and largely supporting the Russian line on the need for war. At the same time, China abstained - rather than voting against -- the UN resolution condemning Russian aggression and has called for negotiations to end the conflict. Those calls seem to be getting a bit more urgent recently.
The real wild card in this is Putin himself. The longer this war drags on, and the larger the number of civilian casualties, the harder China's position becomes. If Putin uses chemical or nuclear weapons, now apparently and uncomfortably on the table, the international opprobrium from any connection to Putin's regime would be enormous. This would likely be magnified if Chinese citizens were killed, which would seem to be a distinct possibility with the use of weapons of mass destruction. China has so far avoided having to make these hard choices, but inside China, despite censorship, condemnation of Putin's war seems to be growing. The big question is where any potential tipping point might be.