The Presidents of France and Brazil visited Beijing over the past two weeks. Both Presidents had important reasons to try to chart a course independent from the United States, so why did both undercut their positions with damaging statements?
In a little less than two weeks, both President Emmanuel Macron of France and President Luis Inacio da Silva of Brazil visited President Xi in Beijing and issued statements that delighted their Chinese hosts and seriously concerned the Biden Administration. Both presidents attempted to distance themselves from the United States, with Macron stating that Europe should not be a US “vassal" and indicating a lack of support for America’s stance on Taiwan. President Lula meanwhile blamed Ukraine and the United States for the Russian invasion of Ukraine and for prolonging the war.
On the surface, there is a common rationale for France and Brazil to demonstrate independence from the United States. Both countries chafe at the US-led global order and want to avoid being drawn too deeply into US economic and strategic priorities. In France’s case, President Macron has pushed for Europe to become a strategically autonomous “third power” between the two global heavyweights, China and the US. He has asserted that the continent has become too dependent on a potentially unreliable United States (very reliable under President Biden, but with a potential return to power by America-first neo-isolationist Donald Trump in the next election, potentially very unreliable).
In Lula’s case, his comments that the US was “encouraging the fighting in Ukraine” and “standing in the way of peace” were likely driven by a different set of priorities. Brazil, as a member of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) has positioned itself as a leader of the Global South. Brazil – like many other middle powers -- sees both a threat and opportunity in closely following the US lead. The threat comes from avoiding entanglements and being forced to choose sides in the great power rivalry between the US and China, and the opportunity comes from the possibility of playing both sides off against one another while garnering trade, investment and cheap energy. Like France, Lula chafes at the dominance of the US dollar, but unlike French President Macron, he also aspires to lead a “peace group” to mediate an end to the war in Ukraine. In addition to these visions of global leadership, Lula has more immediate reasons for warming up to China. By most accounts, the February visit by President Lula to the White House was disappointing – long on rhetoric but short on support for Brazil’s economic and environmental goals. By contrast, Lula brought 240 Brazilian business leaders to Beijing and signed 15 trade deals worth over $10 billion on energy, agriculture and technology. China surpassed the US as Brazil’s largest trading partner in 2009. US and Chinese investments in Brazil seem to be moving in opposite directions, with US firms, such as Ford, selling their assets while the Chinese are eager to invest. Lula believes he must show results to remain ahead of his narrowly defeated rival, Jair Bolsanaro, and sees Chinese investment and trade as an important way to accomplish that.
Macron’s and Lula’s comments were welcomed by China and Russia, but they did not go over well in the US, or indeed, in Europe. The strongest criticism of Macron came from NATO allies, or soon to be allies. Baltic, Nordic and former Soviet satellite states such as a the Czech Republic were particularly scathing, recognizing at the end of the day that their security rests on a NATO firmly underpinned by the United States. Lula did not fare any better – his remarks were strongly criticized by Ukraine, which offered to show him “the real causes and essence of Russian aggression,” while the White House accused him of “parroting Russian and Chinese propaganda.” In both cases, Macron and Lula were criticized in their own countries for appearing naïvely out of touch on the international stage, legitimating Chinese and Russian views of the international system, and for undercutting the international order. While neither leader refuted their remarks, their foreign policy establishments went into near-immediate damage control, attempting to “clarify” their remarks. The Elysee Palace issued a statement that “France is not equidistant between the United States and China. The United States is our ally with shared values.” Brazil’s response was more muted, privately acknowledging that the comments had generated “unnecessary noise” and admitting that Lula had seriously damaged his credibility as a potential partner for any peace negotiations. If nothing else, the concern generated by Macron's and Lula's remarks demonstrates the difficulty of charting a middle path in an increasingly fragmented - and overheated -- international environment.