In April, 1955, the leaders of approximately 30 nations met at the first Asian-African Summit in Bandung, Indonesia to create a “new way” between the United States and Soviet Union, already deep into the Cold War. The Summit was an important step in creating a Non-Aligned Movement of 120 countries, now a recognized subgroup of the United Nations. Locked into the zero sum bipolarity of the Cold War, American administrations actively sought to engage neutral nations and to create trade, security and economic linkages that would tie these countries to the West. American policymakers also worked to build up international institutions designed to uphold a strong global system with the United States at its foundation.
The BRICS movement (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) has much in common with the Non-Aligned movement, though it was founded not so much out of fear of a great power rivalry as in reaction to the G-7 intergovernmental forum of industrialized democracies. But where the United States actively tried to engaged with Non-Aligned nations during the Cold War in order to limit Soviet and Chinese influence, it has no such corresponding strategy on how to deal with the BRICS – an odd state of affairs since two of the BRICS (China and Russia) are now increasingly adversarial and possess the largest nuclear arsenal (Russia) and second largest economy in the world (China). More importantly, both would like to see the creation of an alternative to the Western-sponsored international system. Brazil and South Africa are probably within this camp. With BRICS expansion set to include Iran as well as Saudi Arabia, the desire to create an alternate global system to that sponsored by the United States will likely grow.
BRICS expansion clearly represents a growing unhappiness with the American-sponsored global order. Some of this is normal – the Global South now has much more bargaining clout than before – rising middle classes, young and increasingly educated workforces, and market clout are all elements that were missing from the Non-Aligned Movement’s high water mark. A particular focus of the BRICS nations is the dominance of the dollar as the international reserve currency, which rankles most BRICS members by tying them into the American-dominated system.
In contrast to the Cold War period, American policies over the past six years seem designed to widen the gap between the United States and its potential partners in the Global South. Part of this is the result of the challenges represented by the Ukraine war and Donald Trump’s infatuation with tariffs – even tariffs on allies. But the Biden’s administration’s focus on a “foreign policy for the middle class” – that is to say, protecting American jobs and reshoring American industries -- have alienated potential partners. Despite a set of generally positive foreign policy achievements, the Biden Administration has done a poor job of educating the public on why engagement with other countries – particularly those from the Global South – actually matters. Much of this has to do with domestic politics – the heady days of globalization hollowed out many American industries and contributed to the anger and resentment felt by Americans who felt left out of the global economic boom. This anger has had great impact on both the left and right in American politics, but most particularly on conservative, “America First” voters. As a result, the Republican controlled House has little interest in supporting American relationships outside of NATO, Japan and Korea and, indeed, wants to undermine the Biden Administration’s leadership, both domestically and internationally.
The BRICS will almost assuredly suffer from many of the same problems the Non-Aligned movement suffered from – an increasingly assertive India is at loggerheads with China over a range of issues and cooperates with the United States in the “Quad” security dialogue (Japan, Australia, India and the United States), and is increasing its defense ties to the US; Saudi Arabia, for all of its recent efforts to distance itself from the US is still a regional adversary of Iran, and would have a hard time cutting its defense ties with the United States. But the US – and indeed Europe as well – is going to have to start taking the relationship with the Global South – particularly the BRICS nations – much more seriously than it has in the past. The implications of dis-engagement, already serious, will become much worse if the United States continues to focus on internal issues rather potential partnerships with the Global South.