There have been many articles about Henry Kissinger’s legacy following his passing on November 29. Much of the retrospection has been negative, with even those who admire him asserting that while Kissinger’s legacy was generally positive his record was “mixed” and “complicated.” That’s putting it mildly. Much of the difficulty that American foreign policy faces today can be traced to Kissinger’s approach to international affairs – and in particular, to his belief in balance of power politics, his embrace of order at the expense of justice, his lack of interest in the developing world (now referred to as the Global South), his dismissal of the importance of human rights and his belief that the United States could have no long term friends and allies – only interests.
Many of the retrospectives on Kissinger assert that his “realist” approach to foreign policy was underpinned by his emigration from Hitler’s Germany in 1938 and his belief that European democracy’s response to the rising tide of Fascism and Naziism was weak and chaotic. “Realists,” as defined by Harvard political scientist Joseph Nye, “accept some moral obligations but see them as severely limited by the harsh reality of anarchic politics. To these thinkers, prudence is the prime virtue.” But while Kissinger may have invoked realism, his concern appears to be more about great power disorder. His biographer, Walter Isaacson, stated that Kissinger commented that “If I had to choose between justice and disorder, on the one hand, and injustice and order, on the other, I would always choose the latter.” His actions as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor seem to bear that out.
Kissinger’s first book, A world restored: the politics of conservatism in a revolutionary age, was an analysis of the creation of a stable balance of power in Europe following the quarter century of war between most of Europe and revolutionary and Napoleonic France, and the shattering of the previously stable European balance of power. The title gives the story line away – the book’s two protagonists, Viscount Castlereagh, Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, and Prince Metternich, Foreign Minister of the Habsburg (Austrian) Empire, endeavor to rebuild a conservative great power balance, essentially reestablishing the old order. Metternich in particular stands out for duplicity and double dealing. Kissinger’s affinity for the Metternichian approach to great power politics was supremely evident in America's opening to China and the promotion of “détente” (the lowering of tensions) with the Soviet Union. Academics, policymakers and journalists have judged these as important successes, though recent scholarship has noted that Mao played an instrumental role in reaching out to the United States and that Nixon had already decided to work to lower tensions with the Soviet Union.
Like Metternich, Kissinger was willing to duplicitously undercut friends and allies, both foreign and domestic, in pursuit of a balance of (great) powers. As his critics note, he had little time for smaller countries, seeing them only as pawns in the great game between the US, China and Russia. In support of this great power world order, Kissinger supported Pakistan’s suppression of Bengali East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), which led to the mass-murder of hundreds of thousands of Bengalis, turned a blind eye to the Argentine military government’s “disappearance” (that is, torture and murder) of perhaps 30,000 of its own citizens suspected of leftist sympathies, and supported the 1973 coup in Chile that led to the death of democratically-elected president Salvador Allende and the rise of a brutal military junta led by General Augusto Pinochet. Mostly for domestic reasons – a “decent interval” - Kissinger also helped prolong the Vietnam war for four years and helped greenlight the bombing of Cambodia, leading to the deaths of perhaps 20,000 American servicemen as well as millions of Vietnamese and Cambodians– and paving the way for the rise of the truly murderous Khmer Rouge dictatorship in Cambodia.
While Kissinger’s approach might have been successful in the 1960’s and ‘70’s, it has not served the United States well in the long run. Indeed, his Machiavellian/Metternichian approach to foreign relations then has created serious problems for the United States today. There are two reasons for this.
First, Kissinger’s policies were frequently contrary to America's self-image as a moral nation, committed to a just global order. Focused on a balance of (great) powers, Kissinger’s approach ignored the problems of the rest of the world – particularly South America and the newly decolonized nations of Africa and Asia. Indeed, American policy actively thwarted democracy in a number of cases – Chile, first and foremost.
Second, this neglect now matters all the more because countries that were once minor players on the global stage are now important powers in their own right, with educated populations, critical resources and minerals, sophisticated technological capabilities, strong manufacturing bases and far-reaching supply chains. While the US continues to be the world’s most dominant economic player, countries such as Brazil, South Africa, India, Argentina, Indonesia and Nigeria are developing rapidly. American support for non-democratic regimes in these countries has left behind a lasting distrust of American motives – and an interest in avoiding an unquestioning alignment with the United States.
The most obvious case of this ambivalence is the response by many nations – even democracies – to Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. India, Brazil, South Africa and many other countries have refused to support US sponsored resolutions condemning Russia, and many countries also continue to import Russia oil and gas, helping to prop up the Putin regime. Some of this ambivalence was bound to occur anyway – China provides a competing model to the United States in ways that Russia never could – but the echoes of Kissinger’s amoral balance of power policies and neglect of the concerns of the Global South and middle powers continues to linger in the background, undercutting American efforts to forge an overarching consensus on a range of pressing global issues.