The Enemy Gets a Vote: How do you end a war when you started it with no plan?

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“We should always be skeptical when so-called experts suggest that all a particular crisis calls for is a little surgical bombing or a limited attack. When the ‘surgery’ is over and the desired result is not obtained, a new set of experts then comes forward with talk of just a little escalation—more bombs, more men and women, more force. History has not been kind to this approach to war-making. In fact this approach has been tragic—both for the men and women who are called upon to implement it and for the nation.” (Colin L. Powell/Foreign Affairs (Winter 1992/3)).

It’s not clear what Donald Trump or the civilian leadership at the State Department and Pentagon expected when the US and Israel went to war with Iran. What is clear is that none of the institutions tasked with safeguarding American security — not the White House, the NSC, the Pentagon, the State Department, nor the CIA — anticipated the war's global impact. The Iranian regime is battered but still intact, global supply chains have been massively disrupted, affecting everything from fertilizer to food to fabric, gas prices are up everywhere, and US forces are burning through their stockpiles of smart offensive and defensive weaponry at a prodigious rate. Perhaps the most telling sign of how little thought the administration gave to the war's consequences was the stranding of thousands of American citizens in the region with no plan for their repatriation — a failure of the most basic presidential responsibility. Meanwhile, despite the devastating effectiveness of the U.S. and Israeli assault, the conflict is taking on a life of its own. Iran is striking back wherever it can — targeting embassies, desalination plants, oil tankers, and military bases — drawing NATO and regional allies into a war that none of them, with the possible exception of Saudi Arabia, wanted any part of.

As the war with Iran enters its third week, neither the President nor his administration have yet settled on a clear statement of the conflict’s actual objectives. Ending Iran’s nuclear program, degrading its ballistic missile program, regime change, suppression of Iran’s support for proxies and “PEACE THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND, INDEED, THE WORLD (Trump’s caps) have all been floated – and contradicted – by officials and administration-aligned members of Congress.

Since the administration had no clear endgame in mind when it started the war, it also has no clear plan on how to end it. A fundamental reason is the absence of a coherent planning process under President Trump, who prizes flexibility, mistrusts outside experts and has confidence in his own instincts over coordinated deliberation.

Coherent planning among the various national security agencies is precisely why President Truman created the National Security Council in 1947. Unfortunately for American security, the NSC has been dramatically reduced under Trump, with more than half of its 350 or so career officials fired or returned to their home agencies soon after he took office. Moreover, Secretary of State Rubio also simultaneously holds the role of NSC Director, further diluting the effectiveness of both the NSC and State Department. All of this no doubt reflects Trump's desire for maximum control and negotiating flexibility, but without a discernible planning process, it is a recipe for chaos inside the administration and incoherence outside of it.

It’s worth recalling that in the mid-1980s, as the Soviet Union entered terminal decline, its collapse created a power vacuum — most acutely across its former sphere of influence — that the United States, as the world's sole remaining superpower, was tempted to fill. Colin Powell understood the dangers of that temptation better than most. No warmonger, he was nonetheless a highly effective practitioner of military power, as demonstrated by his leadership as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs during Operation Desert Storm. But it was his two tours in Vietnam that most shaped his thinking. Powell had watched that war — and later Middle Eastern interventions — drain American moral, economic, and political capital for negligible gain. In response, he formulated eight principles designed to help civilian policy makers avoid future quagmires, eventually known as the Powell Doctrine.

Powell’s eight questions were simple to state, but difficult to honor in practice:

Is a vital national security interest threatened?

Do we have a clear and attainable objective?

Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?

Have all other nonviolent policy means been fully exhausted?

Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?

Have the consequences of U.S. action been fully considered?

Is the action supported by the American people?

Do we have genuine broad international support?

If Desert Storm was the clearest expression of Powell's doctrine, Trump's attack on Iran is its polar opposite. There was no immediate national security threat, no clear objective, no risk analysis, no serious effort to negotiate, no visible exit strategy, and no consideration of regional or global consequences. International support for the war is virtually nonexistent outside Israel, while public support has been absent from the beginning — polling averages show more than 50% of Americans opposing the war versus fewer than 38% in favor. This last point is particularly striking: no president in modern American history has launched a war with a majority of the public already opposed.

Wars have a way of taking on a life of their own, and America has a history of optimism bias. The Civil War began with 90-day enlistments and ended four years later with 700,000 dead; Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan all lasted far longer than policy makers or the public ever anticipated. As Trump's first Secretary of Defense, General James Mattis, observed: "No war is over until the enemy says it's over. We may think it over, we may declare it over, but in fact, the enemy gets a vote." As Mattis and Powell knew, adversaries adapt, persist, and rarely accept defeat simply because you declare it. This is certainly true for Iran's leadership. For them, surviving to fight another day is victory.

Sources

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  1. How Trump miscalculated on the Iran war – (Mark Mazzetti, Tyler Pager and Edward Wong/NYTimes) Read article nytimes.com
  2. Trump’s war takes an unnerving turn as damning new leaks hit (Greg Sargent interview with Elizabeth Saunders/The New Republic) Read article newrepublic.com
  3. What’s next for the war in Iran? (Michael Froman/Council on Foreign Relations) Read article cfr.org
  4. 2026 National Defense Strategy: Restoring Peace through Strength for a new Golden Age of America (Department of War) Read article media.defense.gov
  5. How Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff see the world (Politico/ Read article politico.com
  6. Iran is an Imperial trap. American walked right in (Fareed Zakaria/Washington Post) Read article washingtonpost.com
  7. Why are we at war with Iran? Trump has given many reasons (Kinsey Crowley/USAToday) Read article usatoday.com
  8. Donald Trump’s 4 objectives in Iran explained (Jay Hilotin/Gulf News) Read article gulfnews.com
  9. Collateral Damage (Anne Applebaum/Substack post) Read article substack.com
  10. Trump’s way of war: Iran, Venezuela and the end of the Powell Doctrine (Richard Fontaine/Foreign Affairs) Read article foreignaffairs.com
  11. The Iran war proves that the Trump Doctrine is a totally new way to use US military power (Andrew Latham/1945) Read article 19fortyfive.com
  12. The fallacy of the short, sharp war: Optimism bias and the abuse of history (Ryan T. Easterday/The Strategy Bridge) Read article thestrategybridge.org
  13. America’s dangerous short war fixation (Raphael S. Cohen and Gian Gentile/RAND commentary, originally published in Foreign Affairs) Read article rand.org
  14. American defense strategy in the face of protracted war (Evan Montgomery and Julian Ouellet/War on the Rocks) Read article warontherocks.com
  15. The Powell Doctrine’s wisdom must live on (Christopher Preble/The New Atlanticist (Atlantic Council) Read article atlanticcouncil.org
  16. What Americans think about the war in Iran, according to recent polls (Linley Sanders/AP, presented in Washington Post) Read article washingtonpost.com

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